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INTRODUCTION
In any given situation there is a large amount of information available to an observer, not all of which is attended to.

Selective attention refers to the ability to

selectively attend to some information and to "filter out"
or not attend to other information.

That information which

is filtered out, or not attended to, is usually considered
irrelevant by an observer, and consequently, is not processed.

This paper will discus that information which is

not consciously attended to.

Of major import will be the

small portion of unattended information which is processed
by an observer without effort or intent.
The phenomenon of selective focusing on incoming information with attention allotted only to information deemed
relevant (and occasional processing of the unattended information) is particularly evident in the case of auditory events.

Consider the amount of incoming information one

guest receives at a cocktail party, where many simultaneous
conversations are occurring.

Although that guest can hear

quite a few different conversations, as they are all taking
place in the same room, he is probably attending to only one
- the conversation he is engaged in.

Our guest is probably

comprehending his conversation alone and is unaware of the
content or messages that any of the surrounding conversations
contain.

Let his name be mentioned in one of the surrounding
1
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conversations however, and he will suddenly become very
aware of that seemingly unprocessed message!
Selective focusing also occurs in the case of visual
events.

When driving along a well traveled path one seems

to do so almost automatically, and is virtually unaware of
the pedestrians on the sidewalks or the cars driving in the
opposite direction.

If one of those pedestrians or drivers

in the passing cars is someone close to the first driver,
however, he will almost certainly notice that person - picking him out from an almost indistinguishable mass of seemingly unprocessed information.
The processing of information from an unattended source
(e.g.

background conversations or passing cars) is a rel-

atively infrequent event.

The bulk of unattended infor-

mation is not processed by an observer, who is completely
unaware bf its content.

Only occasionally does some unat-

tended information become meaningful to an observer.

Two

explanations are usually offered to account for this phenomenon.
Units of information with low recognition thresholds
(such as one's own name) are recognized very easily, even
without conscious effort or intent.

These units can thus

be recognized even when present at an unattended source.
Another current explanation of processing of unattended

J
information is seen in the idea of automaticity of processing, which suggests that some information is recognized
"automatically".

According to this view, when an obser-

ver has enough practice with a stimulus word (enough practice recognizing something), he is able to recognize it
without attention (i.e.

conscious effort or intent), even

when it is present at an unattended source.

It should

be noted that while these two explanations account for the
same phenomena - the processing of unattended information,
and that they overlap in that often low recognition threshold information is the same information that is said to be
processed automatically, they are quite different as they
postulate very different mental processes.
While both low recognition threshold theory and automatic processing theory are adequate explanations of the
recognition of very familiar or very meaningful stimuli, it
i

is felt that if information is processed that is neither
highly practiced nor highly meaningful, these theories might
be deemed inadequate explanations.

A series of studies will

be conducted that will investigate the processing of unattended visual information and the adequacy of current
planations of such processing.

ex~

A brief summary of the stud-

ies to be conducted and the logic behind them is presented
below.
It has been established that although subjects are

4
generally unaware of unattended visual information, they
will notice their own name if it is printed in the area of
the unattended information.

This series of studies will

attempt to determine if any other information is processed
when presented at an unattended source.

At the level of

attended information it has been found that subjects are
able to remember information much more successfully if it
can be clustered into one semantic category than if it is
a bulk of seemingly unrelated information.
investigate that

sam~

This study will

effect at the level of unattended in-

formation (the amount of unattended information identified
on a subsequent recognition test when all of the unattended
information can be grouped into one semantic category will
be compared to the subsequent recognition of unattended information when the information cannot be semantically grouped).

It has also been found that, at the level of attended

information, concrete stimuli are remembered much more succesfully than abstract stimuli.

This effect will be inves-

tigated at the level of unattended information (subsequent
recognition of concrete stimuli will be compared to the subsequent recognition of abstract stimuli).

Prev~ous

research

has shown that when subjects are asked to respond to one of
two conflicting dimensions of a stimulus the response to the
first dimension will interfere with the response to the second dimension (this is called a Stroop type interference
effect).

This interference effect will be tested using un-

5
attended information - one dimension will be at the level
of attended information and one at an unattended level.
It is felt that the results of these studies will directly relate to the current explanations of processing of
unattended information.

If, when stimulus words are neither

highly practiced nor highly meaningful (to the subjects),
no interference of the types described above occurs, it
would suggest that unattended information is processed only
when it is highly practiced or highly meaningful (such as
one's own name) and would thus support current explanations.
If however, information is processed when it is neither
highly practiced nor highly meaningful (as would be evidenced by the semantic processing of category information, a
superiority effect for concrete over abstract stimuli or a
Stroop type interference effect), it would clearly suggest
a need to revise current explanations.

REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE
This literature review will cover three major topics
relevant to the evaluation of the current explanations of
processing of unattended information.

The first topic to be

covered will be attention, specifically selective attention.
Auditory information processing studies, Stroop effects,
evidence for "automatic processing", and explanations of
processing of unattended information will all be discussed.
Following the discussion of attention will be presentations of research related to clustering effects as seen in
recall tests and the recall of concrete versus abstract
stimuli.

This literature is important as the recall of

clustered (categorized) items and the recall of concrete
versus abstract stimuli will later be tested at tne level of
unattended information and compared to the recall patterns
at the level of attended information.
Attention
Introduction.

In 1890 William James wrote, "Everybody

knows what attention is," and that without selective focusing, "experience is utter chaos."

Unfortunately however,

the matter is not quite that simple.

In 1890 everybody did

not know what attention was, and almost 100 years later, we
still don't!

The subject of attention is a very broad one.
6
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The are many different definitions of it, models describing
it, and subcategories within it.

Posner and Boies (1971)

suggested that there are three major topics or categories
under which studies of attention might be grouped.
first was the notion of alertness.

The

Maintaining attention in

the sense of alertness refers to the ability to perform
long, boring tasks without letting attention drift.

A sec-

ond category of attention was defined as selectivity, the
ability to select information from one source or kind over
other possible sources or kinds.

The third topic of atten-

tion was defined as processing capacity, the limit on man's
ability to perform simultaneous mental operations.
These three topics of attention encompass a great deal
of research, but demonstrate one very general principle
which is the foundation of most major theories of attention
(Kahneman, 1973;
1975;
1977):

Norman & Bobrow, 1975;

Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977;

Posner & Snyder

Shiffrin & Schneider

The conceptualization that attention is a very lim-

ited natural resource.

We are unable to attend to some-

thing for an unlimited amount of time, or to attend to an
unlimited amount of things.

The more complex (difficult)

a task, the more attention it requires.

While we are able

to walk and talk at the same time, it is very difficult to
perform two less practiced tasks simultaneously, such as
reading a difficult book and delivering a lecture.

If the

8
difficulty of a task varies, the attentional allotment will
also vary.

learning to drive is a very difficult task and

takes the full concentration of a new driver - he or she
probably has trouble talking while driving.

After becom-

ing practiced however, many people are able to carry on a
lively conversation while driving a car, although if a difficult turn must be negotiated, conversation may temporarily stop while the driver concentrates on that turn (Kahneman,

1973).

This paper will investigate aspects of Posner and Boies' second category, selective attention.

Everyday exper-

ience tells us that we attend to some environmental stimuli
more than others and that the
unnoticed.

unatte~ded

stimuli often pass

While we are normally aware of all attended in-

formation, the bulk of the unattended information is usually never processed, we are neither able to recognize unattended information, nor recall it.

When reading an inter-

esting book or engrossed in a conversation, we are often unaware of a radio playing in the background, unable to identify the last few songs played.

Only occasionally do we

become aware of the content of unattended information.
Auditory information processing studies have provided
evidence for selective attention and the occasional processing of unattended information.

These studies will be

discussed in the next section of this paper.

Following

9
that will be a discussion of the Stroop effect, which provides evidence for the processing of unattended visual information.

This chapter on attention will then be directed

to the presentation of some very recent selective attention
research and a discussion of the concept of automatic processing, and finally, conclude with a discussion of current
explanations of processing of unattended information.
Auditory information processing research:
for selective attention.

Much work on selective attention

has used the auditory modality.
ality are clear:

Evidence

The advantages of this mod-

Auditory attention can be studied with-

out the encumbrance of orientation movements which dominate visual attention (Broadbent, 1958), audition can be
characterized by two distinct and obvious channels (Kahneman, 1973), and there is no physical mechanism for selective
attention in audition while there is an excellent one in
vision, namely, looking away (Wolford & Morrison, 1980).
Research by Cherry (1953) led to the development of
an experimental procedure called shadowing which is instrumental in studying unattended information.

In that tech-

nique a subject is asked to follow a spoken message, repeating every word, and ignore other messages to which he
is simultaneously exposed.

It was found that the presence

of a distracting message barely impaired shadowing performance when the rejected and attended messages were seper-

10
ated by an obvious physical characteristic, such as spatial
origin (i.e. a different message presented to each ear).
It was also found that subjects were always aware of the
presence of the rejected message at the unattended ear,
but could recall virtually none of its content or even the
language in which it was spoken.

Subjects were only aware

of gross units of information in the unattended channel,
such as the sex of the voice delivering the message, and
could only detect major physical changes, such as a change
of voice or a switch from a voice to a tone.
An early theory of attention was developed by Broadbent

(1958).

This theory can be classified as a filter theory

and was based on the idea that information processing is restricted by channel capacity.· Briefly, Broadbent postulated
a sequence of three processes:

A short term store (S-sys-

tem), a selective filter, and a

limi~ed

(P-system).

capacity channel

Concurrent stimuli enter into the S-system in

parallel and are analyzed there for physical features such
as location or tone.
acity of the S-system.

There is no definite limit on the capThe selective filter allows relev-

ant stimuli to enter the P-system for further processing.
Filter theory interprets selective attention as setting the
filter to select a certain class of stimuli and to reject
all others.

Irrelevant messages are simply allowed to decay

in the S-system without undergoing more advanced processing

11
in the P-system.

Filter theory implies that attention can-

not be divided, as the P-system performs no parallel processing of discrete stimuli.

According to this theory, the

apparent division of attention in the performance of simultaneous activities can be explained by alternation between
channels or between acts.
Intuitively, the filter theory seems correct.

It is

obvious that we have a limited processing capacity and we
do sometimes "switch" attention (e.g. stopping a conversation in order to negotiate a difficult turn while driving).

An early experiment using the dichotic listening

technique supported this theory (Broadbent, 1954).

Broad-

bent presented three digits to one ear of his subjects,
and simultaneously, presented three different digits to
the other ear.

He found that the subjects could report the

digits as they were presented to each ear much more successfully than they could report the digits as they were
presented temporally (if the digits 6, J, 9 were presented
to the left ear and the digits 5, 8, 7 were presented to
the right ear, subjects were able to report them in that
order much more successfully than in correct temporal order which would have 6,5

J,8

9,7).

Broadbent interpreted

this difference to be the result of having to switch attention between sources (chal'1.nels) more often in the case
of temporal report.

12
These results, along with Cherry's earlier results
support the view that only one signal (message) can be processed at one time, and provided the foundation for Broadbent's theory.

Later studies have shown that Broadbent's

filter theory was incorrect, however.
Although Cherry (1953) showed that, as a rule, subjects were unaware of the content of the unattended message
when performing a

sr.~dowing

task, Moray (1959) was able to

show that there are exceptions to that rule.

Using a para-

digm similar to Cherry's, it was shown that although subjects were generally unaware of the unattended message (the
message they did not shadow), they did notice the pyesence
of their own name within that message.

Broadbent's filter

theory does not account for this phenomena.
Two experiments conducted by Gray and Wedderburn (1960)
further challenged Broadbent's theory.

Using a paradigm

similar to Broadbent's (1954) they presented to alternate
ears the syllables composing a word (in sequence) and random digits;

when a syllable was presented to one ear, a

digit was presented to the other simultaneously.

For ex-

ample, they presented OB, 2, TIVE to the left ear of a subject and 8, JEC, J to the right ear, with OB 8, JEC 2, and
TIVE J occuring simultaneously.

If Broadbent's theory were

correct, subjects would have found it easier to report the
stimuli ear by ear, such as OB-2-TIVE or 8-JEC-J.

This was

lJ
not the case:

Subjects would report OBJECTIVE,

8,2,J.

In a second experiment Gray and Wedderburn used the same
procedure but presented phrases and digits simultaneously,
such as MICE-2-CHEESE to one ear, and 8-EAT-9 to the other
(with the pairs MICE-8, 2-EAT, and CHEESE-9 each occurring
simultaneously).

As in the fractured word experiment, sub-

jects grouped the message segments by meaning rather than
by channel.
Treisman (1960) looked at another situation in which
subjects were instructed to shadow a particular ear.

The

message in the to-be-shadowed ear was meaningful until a
certain point, at which time it turned into a random sequence of words (such as, I SAW THE GIRL song was wishing).
Simultaneously, the meaningful message switched to the other
ear, which had previously been a random sequence of words
(such as, me that bird JUMPING IN THE STREET).

Many sub-

jects switched ears, against instructions, and continued
to follow the meaningful message (that is, the shadowed
message they would report would be, "I SAW THE GIRL JT.JIVIPING
IN THE STREET").
Although Broadbent's filter theory and early research
showed that very little was known about the unattended message and suggested that subjects simply "turned one ear off"
the above studies showed that this was not the case and
that there are times when the unattended message is pro-

14
cessed and becomes meaningful.

In an attempt to accomodate

the evidence against filter theory, Treisman (1960, 1964)
proposed a modification of that theory that described filtering as a relative process:

The rejected message was

attenuated, not eradicated.
According to Treisman, a sensory message activates hypothetical "dictionary units" in memory.

Each unit has a

threshold which must be exceeded for perception to occur.
The threshold for highly significant stimuli, such as one's
name, is very low.
a

wo~d

Because of the variation of thresholds,

presented in an irrelevant charillel may be perceived

in spite of attenuation, which would explain Moray's (1959)
name effect.

Thresholds can be temporarilly lowered, ac-

cording to Treisman, when an external context makes the occurance of a given word highly probable, which would explain Gray and Wedderburn's (1960) and Treisman's (1960)
results.
In a major departure from filter theory,

T~eisman

con-

cluded that divided attention and parallel processing are
possible for two simultaneous inputs, but only if they do
not reach the same analyzers;
when the same analyzer is used.
that:

serial processing must occur
Treisman's model suggests

a) perception is contingent upon recognition thres-

holds, which are variable,

b) parallel processing can occur,

but only when different analyzers are used, and c) "irrel-

15
evant messages" fall on a dull not a deaf ear.

This model

will be discussed in greater detail in a later section of
this chapter.
Stroop effects.

A Stroop type interference occurs

when a subject is asked to respond to one of two dimensions
of a given stimulus and the second dimension delays or interferes with that response.

Traditional Stroop stimuli are

color words printed in an ink color that is inconsistent
with the meaning of the word.

Interference occurs when a

subject is asked to respond to the color of the ink.

The

printed word interferes with his response and he will characteristically respond faster to patches of color than he
will if it is in the form of a printed color word that signifies a color other than that of the ink.
The origins of the Stroop test go back almost to the
beginning of experimental psycholo!gy.

In 1883, Wilhelm

v1fund t is said to have suggested to one of his students,
James Cattell, that he do his doctoral research on the time
it takes to name colors and objects and to read the corresponding words (Jensen & Rohwer, 1966).

The conflict or

interference situation, which is the main feature of the
Stroop effect was first discussed by Jaensch (1929, cited
by Jensen & Rohwer, 1966) in connection with his research
on perceptual types.

The color-word interference test was
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first introduced by John rtidley Stroop.

Stroop's doctoral

thesis was concerned with serial verbal reactions and used
the color-word interference test now associated with his
name (Stroop, l9J5).
The original Stroop test consisted of three cards:

A word card with the names of colors printed in black ink
(W), a color card with rows of patches of colors (C), and
a color word card with rows of color names printed in ink
of a conflicting color (CW).
purple were used.

Red, green, blue, brown, and

The words and colors were arranged in a

10 x 10 matrix of evenly spaced rows and columns.

Any reg-

ularity of sequence (horizontally or vertically) was avoided.

Each of the five colors or words occurred twice in

each column and each row, and no attribute was immediately
adjacent to itself in either column or row.

Subjects were

instructed to verbally report either the colors or the words
reading from left to right, starting with the top row, and
to respond as rapidly as possible while trying to be as
accurate as possible.
Within the format of reporting a series of words or
colors the basic data are the total time needed to name
the stimuli (colors or words) for each card.

This format

has been very successful in the production of interference.
There is a color-word interference, or conflict, experienced when the subject is asked to name the color of the
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lettering of the incongruous CW card.

This effect is quite

robust and is exhibited over a wide range of phenomena.

For

example, Stroop like interference has been found not only
for naming colors in the presence of color words, but in
the presence of other words (Klein, 1964;

Warren, 1972), in

the naming of achromatic shades (Dyer, 1971a), in naming
four positions of a compass when the positions are labeled
with incongruent direction names (White, 1969), in naming
directions specified by arrows when the arrows are labeled
with conflicting direction names (Shor, 1970), in naming
words above or below a fixation point when the positions
are labeled with conflicting position names (Logan & Zbroqoff, 1979;

Seymour, 197J), and with different preexposure

times to a color word (Dyer, 1971b).
Studies alluded to above have used stimuli such as
arrows, compass points, and "above" or ':below"
position
l
..
judgements.

It appears that in order to be correctly called

a Stroop task the stimuli used must meet two criteria:
Stimuli must be constructed in such a way that subjects can
be asked to respond to one dimension of a two dimensional
stimulus, and within those two dimensions one must represent an attribute or concept and one must represent an attribute name.
Varied explanations of the Stroop effect have been offe~ed,

many of which hinge on the finding by Fraisse (1969)
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that reading is faster than naming.

From that finding it

is assumed that verbal information is processed faster than
non-verbal information (the attribute name is processed
faster than the attribute itself) and thus, the verbal information interferes with the non-verbal information.
position was refined by Palef and Olson (1975).

This

They con-

tend that the verbal versus non-verbal information is not important per se, but rather the relative speeds at which
the two forms of information (dimensions) are processed.
They postulated that interference results _when the response
is required to the slower of the two processing modes (the
non-verbal dimension in the color-word stimuli).
Hintzman, Carre, Eskridge, Owens, Shaff and Sparks
(1972) felt that the effect is not caused by interference
but-by response competition.

They argued that if the effect

were due to interference at the time of encoding, any printed word (attribute name) would interfere with the encoding
of the color (attribute).

This is simply not so.

Klein

( 1964) has shov!Y1. that although all words will affect the processing of a color stimulus, different attributes of words
will differentially affect the color naming responses.

A

standard Stroop type experiment was conducted which investigated the interference effects of verbal stimuli varying
in their'relationship to the ink colors.
were used.

Six conditions

In each condition the verbal stimuli consisted
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of items typed in the colors rec, green, yellow, and blue.
In Condition A all verbal items were nonsense syllables
(hjh, eugic, bdhr);

in Condition B they were rare English

words (sol, helot, eft, abjure);

in Condition C they were

common English words not closely associated with colors
(put, take, friend);

in Condition D they were words which

were not color names but which implicated colors in their
meaning (lemon, grass, sky) and were presented irc incon~ruent

0

combinations with the ink colors; ir. ConditionE

they were different words of the same response class
the ink colors (tan, purple, black).

as

Condition F was the

standard Stroou Condition, the words reuresented the color
~

~

names but were presented in incongruent combinations of
color and word.

Results showed that in all conditions re-

sponses were significantly slower for the conflict-stimuli
than for the colors-alone stimuli.

As the words became more

meaningful and more closely related to colors the interference increments became increasingly larger.

It was con-

eluded that the impeding effect of the verbal stimul~ upon
the relevant color naming response is governed by ~he rela~ive meaningfulness of the words

rect response).

(with respect to the cor-

Many studies have shown that when an at-

tribute and attribute name are consistent the interference
effect does not occur (Dyer, 1971b;
Ridley, Johnson & Braisted, 1978).

Hintzman et. al., 1972;
If the interference be-

tween two modes were occurring, one dimension would inter-
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fere with the other dimension (as seen in resuonse latencies) regardless of whether or not the two dimensions represented consistent information.

Hintzmen et. al. felt

that the delay exhibited with an interference effect of
this sort represents response competition and that the consistency effect occurs because there is no competition when
the two dimensions (responses) are the same.
Hintzman (1978) later revised his uosition and stated
that the Stroop effect shows that encoding is automatic,
or effortless, that we cannot turn off the retrieval of
highly familiar information even if we want to, and that because interference is selective (different words produce
different levels of interference), it is probably the meanings of the words that are being retrieved.

Hasher and

Zacks (1979) use the Stroop effect to demonstrate the automaticity of learning.

They feel that the word meanings are

automatically activated and explain the effect by stating
that the difficulty in reading the ink colors comes from
the interfering reading responses made to the incongruent
color words.
It is this assumption that the meanings of the printed words are encoded "automatically" that is relevant to
the current discussion.

That some information cannot be

ignored (that subjects cannot selectively attend to some
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information), but will be processed automatically, without
effort or intent, is a very iwportant finding with respect
to selective attention.

The idea of "automatic processing"

may be very important to the discussion of processing of
unattended information and will be further discussed below.
Recent evidence for processing unattended visual information:

Automatic processing.

Although the majority

of the research on selective attention has been concerned
with the auditory modality (probably due to the conveniences discussed earlier)
the visual modality.

some studies have also utilized

In addition to the research dealing

with Stroop phenomena discussed above, some studies have
been classified as d.ealing with Stroop like phenomena, that
is, studies similar to the Stroop studies, but that do not
meet the criteria for a true Stroop test.
One such article, dealing with the precedence of global dimensions in visual perception, is that of Navon (1977).
Navon proposed that perception proceeds from a general,
global analysis to a more and more specific, local analysis,
and that his findings demonstrated the "inevitability of
global processing".

These claims were based·o:r.. ti1e results

of an experiment in which he used sti..'11uli composed of letters made up of smaller letters, as shown in Figure 1.
These stimuli, as originally suggested by Kinchla (1974),
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were used such that the identified properties of the global
and local dimensions could be equated (i.e. the set of
identified global features - the large letter, was identical to the set of identified local features - the small
letters).
Subjects were shown the stimuli described above under
two different conditions.

In the global directed condition

the subject was asked to indicate whether the global character (the large letter) was an Horan S.

In the local

directed condition the subject was asked to indicate whether
the local characters (the small letters making up the large
one) were Hs or Ss.

The results indicated that the global

pattern was responded to faster than the local characters,
and more importantly, subjects were able to voluntarily
attend to the global dimension without being affected by
the local dimension, put they were not able to attend to
'

the local dimension without being affected by the global
dimension (i.e. under the global directed condition it
made no difference whether the two levels of structure were
consistent or conflicting;

under the local directed con-

dition consistent stimuli were responded to more rapidly
than were conflicting stimuli).

Navon's results are shown

in Figure 2.
That global attributes were processed more quickly
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in Navon's study was perhaps not surprising.

There is ev-

idence (Lupp, Hauske & Wolfe, 1976) that subjects respond
rapidly to low spatial frequencies and progressively more
slowly to higher frequencies, which in itself would predict Navon's findings.

There is also considerable evi-

dence that single letters are easier to perceive than letters flanked by other letters (Townsend, Taylor & Brown,

1971;

Wolford & Hollingsworth, 1974).

This phenomenon is

called a lateralmasking effect and would appear in Navon's
stimulus set only on the local level, which also may have
made letters within the local level more difficult to perceive.

What is surprising, however, was the finding that

the local dimensions did not interfere with the processing
of the global dimensions, while the global dimensions did
interfere with the processing of the local dimensions.

It

was this finding that led Navon to conclude that processing
on the global level was inevitable;

it seemed that subjects

had to process the large (global) letter first in both con-

ditions.
In response to Navon's results, Kinchla and Wolfe

(1979) again addressed the problem of the order of visual
processing.

The stimuli used were similar to those used

by Navon, however, the overall size of the stimuli was varied over a much larger range of visual angle.

Navon pre0

sented stimuli at a visual angle of approximately J 12';
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Kinchla and Wolfe presented stimuli in which the height of
the large letter subtended, with equal probability on each
0
trial. 4.8°, 6.7°, 8.0°, 10.J , or 22.1° visual angle.

Sub-

jects heard a target letter defined and were then shown a
stimulus letter.

Their task was to respone "yes" if the

target letter corresponded to either the large letter or
the small letters in the stimulus letter and "no" if it did
not.

It was found that "no" responses generally took long-

er than "yes" responses ar.d that there was a crossover interaction between the speed of a "yes" response to large
and small targets 'and the visual angle of the display, as
shown in Figure J.

At smaller visual angles the large let-

ter evoked the fastest "yes", while at the larger visual
angles the small letters did.

These results suggested nei-

ther an invariant global to local process (which Navon had
proposed as inevitable) nor an invariant local to global
process (as a feature analytic model would predict).
Another series of studies was conducted by Martin
(1979), again in direct response to Navon's findings.

Mar-

tin used stimuli similar to those used by Navon, letters
made up of smaller letters.

As in Navon's study, stimuli

were presented in one of four possible quadrants of the
stimulus field, immediately adjacent to the field's central and vertical axes.

The global shape subtended 2.~

0

to the left or right of the center point of the field and
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4.1°above or below it.
tions:

Her research addressed two ass~~p-

The first was that global processing preceeds lee-

al processing, and the second was that when two conflicting
types of information are processed, perception of a secondary (more slowly available) type is impaired by the primary type.
In Martin's main experiment, subjects were shown a
global letter composed of several smaller, local letters.
The sparsity of each stimulus was varied by having each
global aspect be comprised of either many or few local ones,
such that the global to local size ratio was varied.
task of the subject was to

iden~ify

The

either the global or

local letters (as instructed) as rapidly as possible.
A two way interaction between sparsity and attentional
instructions was found.

Depending upon conditions, either

the global aspects or the local aspects of the stimuli were
responced to more rapidly, as shown in Figure 4.

Although

global processing was significantly faster than local processing for stimuli with many local elements, it was significantly slower than local processing for stimuli with

.

few local elements.

The results of her series of four ex-

periments consistently demonstrated a global processing
priority only for many-element stimuli, a local processing
priority appeared for few-element stimuli.
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Hoffman's (1980) research also investigated the processing of levels of structure, utilizing a paradigm that
combined elements of Navon's (1977) interference paradigm
and Kinchla and Wolfe's (1979) target search task.

Each

of his trials began with the presentation of a memory set
of one, -two, or four letters.

A stimulus pattern was then

presented consisting of a large letter made up of smaller
letters.

A letter was considered positive if it was a mem-

ber of the memory set and negative if it was not.

The ex-

periment was divided into a "large only" condition in which
the target letter might appear at the global level, a
"small only" condition in which the target letter might appear at the local level, and a "both" condition in which
the target letter might appear at either level.

In one

experiment (using the letters L,X,T,Y,H,N,F, and Z), it was
found that in the focused attention conditions subjects
were unable to attend to only the instructed dimension.

Re-

action times were faster when the two dimensions (large and
small letters) were in agreement than when they conflicted,
and the magnitude of the interference provided by the tobe-ignored dimension was approximately the same in both the
global directed and the local directed conditions.

In the

divided attention, or "both" condition, reaction time was
the same for targets located at either the global or local
level, and generally slower than for the corresponding focused attention condition.

Jl
In a second experiment Hoffman distorted the quality
of information at the local and/or global levels by changing
the position of a randomly chosen element of a letter (at
the appropriate global or local level) from its correct position to a new randomly chosen position within the letter
matrix.

5.

An example of Hoffman's stimuli is shown in Figure

When the small letter was distorted, a global precedence

nattern was obtained:

Subjects could not ignore the large

letter when told to attend only to the small, and the identity of the small letter was irrelevant when subjects were
attending to the large letter.

It is important to note that

these results are in accordance with those which would be
predicted by Navon's precedence model.

When the large let-

ter was distorted however, a corresponding local precedence
pattern was obtained, implying that both the large letters
and the small letters were proceeding through a pattern recognition process sirnultaneohsly, and that the relative quality of information at each level determines the speed of
.+.
recognlulon.

The results of the Stroop studies mentioned earlier
and Navon's work mentioned above suggest that some processing is so automatic that it cannot be ignored:

Subjects

cannot attend to an instructed dimension of a stimulus if
another available dimension is one which is processed automatically.

These studies imply that certain elements are
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always processed automatically, in an invarient
Later work (Hoffamn, 1980;

maw~er.

Kinchla & Wolfe, 1979;

Martin,

1979) has shown that the ease (automaticity) of processing
of different dimensions is variable, and contingent upon
the quality of information available at those different
dimensions.
In a more direct investigation of unattended visual
information Neisser (Note 1) demonstrated what he called
selective reading.

Subjects were presented with text in

which the lines were printed in alternate colors.

Subjects

were instructed to selectively attend to half of the material, that is, they were instructed to read the text printed
in one color and to ignore the text printed in the other
color.

For the most part, subjects were unaware of the un-

attended information (the lines of text which they were not
instructed to read).

They were aware of highly familiar

items however, such as their own names.
Although the above study was considered a visual analog to the auditory selective attention studies discussed
earlier, it has been argued that the results may have been
seriously confounded, due to the fact that the unattended
visual information was located somewhere in the periphery
of the retina.

Recognition of the unattended material

may have been inferior to that of the attended material
simply because the attended information was located at the

J4
subject's fovea (where acuity is quite high) while the unattended information was located in the periphery (where
1
acuity is deficient) .
In an effort to account for this rather serious confound, v1Jolford and Morrison ( 1980) designed a new paradigm
in order to study the processing of unattended visual information.

A pair of digits vvas presented to subjects on

the face of a CRT seperated by five degrees of visual angle,
with a word centered between the two digits.

Subjects were

instructed to judge whether the two digits were of the same
parity (both odd or both even) or of different parity (one
odd and one even) and to ignore the centered word.

It

was found that no processing capacity was used to moniter
the centered word (response latencies were the same with
or without a centered word, as shown in Figure 6).

Although

subjects were generally unaware of the centered words and
performance was at chance level on a subsequent two alternaternative forced choice recognition test,

they were aware

of a highly salient centered word, such as their ovm name,
and performance was well above chance level on the subsequent recognition test.
As mentioned earlier, an explanation which would account for this phenomena is the concept of automatic pro1

It has been shoV~m that visual acuity is superior for
stimuli presented at the fovea (Cornsweet, 1970)-
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cessing.

It is contended that some material is processed

so often that it becomes increasingly practiced and familiar
until that information is processed automatically, without
effort or intent (e.g.

one's own name).

In an experiment in which subjects were instructed to
write dictated words while reading it was shown that subjects became increasingly more efficient at this task
(Hirst, Spelke, Caharack & Neisser, 1980).

The results

were interpreted such that it was shown that attention is
a skill that improves with practice:

While at first sub-

jects found reading and writing (simultaneously) very difficult, with practice the task became very easy.

The more

a task has become practiced, the less attention it requires;
highly practiced processes require no attention (capacity)
at all.

Such highly practiced processes are referred to as

automatic (Anderson, 1980).
to operate continually.

Automatic processes are said

They do not require awareness or

intention and drain minimal amounts of energy from attentional capacity (Hasher & Zacks, 1979).
A comparison of recognition threshold and automaticity
explanations of processing unattended information.

As

mentioned earlier, in an effort to accomodate results which
suggested that unattended information is sometimes processed (Gray & Wedderburn, 1960;

Moray, 1959;

Treisman, 1960,
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1964) an attenuation model of selective attention has been
proposed (Treisman, 1960, 1964).

It was suggested that all

incoming stimuli activate hypothetical "dictionary units"
that have thresholds that must be exceeded for perception
to occur.

The thresholds for highly significant stimuli,

such as one's own name, are permanently low, while the
threshold for a stimulus that context makes highly probable is temporarily lowered.
of thresholds,

Because of these variations

a stimulus of high significance or high pro-

bability that is presented in an unattended channel can be
perceived.

The posited threshold mechanism is described as

follows:
It may be that the channel filter attenuates messages
rather than blocks them completely. If so, ~ords which
were highly important or relevant to the subject could
be picked out when the threshold for identifying them
was permanently or temporarily lowered within the wordidentification system itself, in spite of their reduced signal-to-noise ratio. A possible system for
identifying words is a hierarchy of tests carried out
in sequence and giving a unique outcome for each word
or other linguistic unit. The decision at each test
point could be thought of as a signal detection problem: A certain ad~ustable cut off or criterion point
is adopted on the word being discriminated, above which
signals are accepted and below which signals are rejected as noise. The criterion determining theresults of the test would be made more liberal for certain outcomes favored by context and probabilities,
by recent use, or by importance. Messages attenuated
by the filter would pass the test only if the criterion
had been lowered in their favor and, if not, would
pass no further through the hierarchy. (p. 14, 1964)
In a recent set of articles, Schneider and Shriffin
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(1977) and Shiffrin and Schneider (1977) distinguished between automatic and controlled processes in human information processing.

Automatic processing was defined as the

activation of a learned sequence of elements in long term
memory initiated by appropriate inputs.

This activation

proceeds automatically, without subject control, without
any capacity allotments, and without demanding attention.
Controlled processing was defined as an activation of a
sequence of elements that requires attention, is capacity
limited, and is controlled by the subject.

In a series

of studies the ways in which subjects scan visual arrays
and the role of automaticity in that activity were investigated.
Subjects were given a target letter or number·and were
instructed to scan a series of visual displays for that
character.

The display consisted of 20 different frames

flashed on a screen.

Subjects were to report if their tar-

get occurred in one of those frames.
ied:

Two factors were var-

The frame size (each frame had one, two, or four char-

acters on it), and the relationship between the target items
and the search items (in the same-category condition, both
the target and the search characters were either letters or
numbers;

in the different-category condition, the target

was a number and the search characters were letters).
formance was dramatically different between between the

Per-
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different- and same-category conditions.

In the different-

category condition, frame size had no effect, but in the
same category condition performance changed dramatically
as a function of frame size (as frame size increased, performance decreased).
Schneider and Shriffrin argued that subjects were so
practiced at detecting a number amoung letters (before the
start of the experiment - due to everyday experience) that
this process was automatic.

In contrast, when subjects had

to distinguish a letter from other letters a more effortful
process was required.

To support this view, another exper-

iment was conducted in which the target letter was always
from one set of letters (B,C,D,F,G,H,J,K,L) and the search
letters were always from another set of letters (Q,R,S,T,V,
W,X,Y,Z).

After 2,100 trials, subjects were at the same

level of performance as in the different-category condition
of the previous experiment.

Subjects needed extensive prac-

tice, but eventually became as efficient in this condition
as in the letter/number search condition, implying that
automatic processing follows consistent mapping of stimuli
to responses (practice).
As a result of these findings, Schneider and Shiffrin
proposed that in novel situations or situations requiring
moment to moment decisions, controlled processes are used
in order to perform accurately, if slowly.

As situations
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become familiar, always requiring the

sa~e

sequences of

processing operations, automatic processing develops such that attention demands are eased and control processes
can be carried out in parallel.

When stimuli are presented

to be processed that do not cause automatic attention responses, a controlled attention response begins.

In the

case of selective attention, the processing organism carries on attention demanding controlled processing on the attended message, with only minimal controlled processing of
the unattended information - just enough to establish
which information is to be given deeper processing.

If

automatic attention responses have been attached to stimuli,
these

s~1muli

will be processed and remembered even when

they are present at an unattended source of information (or
an ignored channel).
While the two aforementioned theories (namely, those
of low recognition threshold processing and automatic processing of information) suggest very different processing
systems, it should be noted that both theories account
for "effortless" processing of the same material.

The at-

tenuation model (low recognition threshold theory) holds
that highly familiar or highly meaningful material is

pro~

cessed even with a very small attentional allotment due to
low recognition thresholds for that material.

Automatic

processing theory holds that highly familiar material is
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processed even with a very small attentional allotment due
to a practiced response pattern.

In both cases it is very

familiar material (such as one's own name) that is processed easily or effortlessly (i.e.

processed even when

that information is present at an unattended source or
channel).
ilar;

To this degree, both theories are very sim-

both accounting for the same phenomena.

2

Accord-

ingly, the adequacy of both theories can be examined simultaneously (with respect to this particular aspect of the
theories), as they will be in the following series of experiments.
Clustering effects.
In a free recall task, subjects view (or hear) a list
of words and then attempt to recall them.

The form the re-

call takes suggest ways in which information is organized
by the subjects.

A very general fact about free recall

is that although there are no restrictions on recall order,

2 rt should be noted that the attenuation th~or~ ~lso
accounts for some effortless processing of less ~amlllar
material, in the case when a given situation makes.the pro~
bability of occurance of ~hat material unusua~ly hlgh . . Thls
phenomena is not accounted for in the automatlc processlng
theory. This situation is not considered in the uresent
body of research however, and thus will not be di~cussed
here. The following series of studies will investigate the
processing of unattended single words and will not offer attended contextual conditions which might affect the probability of occurrance of any given single word.
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the actual order in which the items are recalled reflects
some order.
this.

Bousfield (195J) was the first to demonstrate

He presented a list of 60 nouns to subjects which

fell into four categories:
chipmunk, camel),
mon),

Animals (such as,

male names (such as,

professiohs (such as,

and vegetables (such as,

giraffe,

Gerald, Owen, Si-

milkman, chemist, dancer),

parsnip, spinich, mushroom).

Although the presentation of the words was in a random order, the recall was not.

Subjects tended to recall items

from the same categories together - a practice Bousfield
termed "clustering".

If recall were random, it would be

expected that a word would be followed by another word from
the same category 25% of the time;
the time however,

this happened 40% of

too often to be attributed to chance.

In response to Bousfield's study, Cohen (196), 1966)
conducted a series of studies investigating the effect of
categorization on word recall.
were examined:

Two types of categories

Exhaustive and non-exhaustive.

Exhaustive

categories were ones in which three or four words represented all the words in that category (such as, North,
South, East, West).

Non-exhaustive categories were ones

which contained a large number of items, only a few of
which were used in the experiment (such as, dog, lion,
horse).

The results indicated that the words were cate~oro

ized by the subjects and that this increased recall.

More-
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over, recall was greater for words in exhaustive categories than in non-exhaustive categories.
In an experiment conducted by Bower, Clark, Lesgold
and Winzenz (1969), the organizational variables in recall
were investigated.
structed.

Several conceptual hierarchies were con-

An example of a conceptual hierarchy for the word

"minerals" is shown in Figure 7.

The list of to-be-re-

called items contained both members of a category and the
category label itself.

The presence of the category name

was assumed to serve as a potent retrieval cue if the subjects used the category name as an encoding tool.

The word

list included nested categories (such as "metals"), such
that a high level category might serve as a superordinate
for lower level instances.

Words were presented all

a~

once for prolonged study (rather than presenting the words
one at a time for a brief duration).

Subjects who had ver-

bal material presented in an accurate nested fashion had
higher free recall than those who had seen inaccurate hierarchies formed by randomly assigning category labels.

Bow-

er et. al. concluded that if subjects encoded words by
means of organizational structure and used that structure
in recall, the ability to recall words was greatly enhanced.
The ability to integrate information into single ideas
or concepts will greatly increase the amount of information
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A conceptual hierarchy of words for the word
"minerals" (Bower et. al., 1969) ·
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one can process.

That is, the ability to integrate sev-

eral encodings, or bits of information at one level, such
that they represent a single encoding or bit of information
at a higher level, greatly increases processing capacity.
The process of integrating several encodings into one is
called chunking;

the higher level units formed in this way

are called chunks (Miller, 1956).

The ability to chunk

information greatly increases one's capacity for information processing.

Chunking cannot occur, however, with-

out familiarity with the incoming material and the chunk itself.

Previous knowledge and information must be activated

in order for chunking to take place (previous knowledge and
information must be activated in order to integrate new
information within that system).

The extensive bulk of

knowledge that is activated can impose a structure on seemingly unrelated material once a match occurs between that
incoming information and stored previous information (Solso, 1979).
The link between stored previous information and chunking was illustrated in an experiment by Bower and Springston (1970) in which subjects were read a letter sequence
and later asked to recall those letters.

In one condition

the letters were presented to the subjects so that they
formed no known group (such as, FB ... IPH ... DTW ... AIB ... M).
In the other condition the letters were dictated to the sub-
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jects so that they did form well known groups (such as,
FBI .. . PHD . .. TWA ... IBM).

As expected, the letters presented

in meaningful groups were recalled much more successfully
than were the letters presented in random groups.
The research reviewed in this section suggests that
memory is structured in an organized way.

The ability to

recode information into higher levels of structure will
greatly enhance processing capacity.

It appears that a

consequence of clustering and chunking is an organized system in which processing capacity, and hence, memory span,·
for information is greatly increased.
Recall of concrete versus abstract stimuli.
In an early study, Brener (1940) demonstrated that
the memory span for concrete words is significantly greater
than that for abstract words.

Another study (Gorman, 1961)

using recognition memory as the dependent measure, demonstrated a similar superiority in short term retention scores
for concrete over abstract stimuli.

Paivo (1963) investig-

ated the learning of adjective-noun paired associates as a
function of adjective-noun word order and noun abstractness.
He found that the adjective-noun paired associates were
most effectively learned when the noun in the pair was concrete.
Dukes and Bastran (1966) studied the recall of con-
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crete and abstract words equated for meaningfulness.

A

list of ten abstract and ten concrete nouns were presented
to subjects one at a time.

Half of the abstract words were

high in frequency and half were low.

The concrete nouns

were equated for frequency in a similar manner.
free recall was tested.

Immediate

Again, significantly more concrete

words were recalled than abstract words.

There was no sig-

nificant effect for word frequency.

Paiva, Yuille and Rogers (1969) have shown that the
concreteness of stimuli is an important determinant of the
difficulty of recall.

Concrete words (for example, ele-

phant, grass, magazine, tomahawk) are more easily recalled
than are abstract words (for example, history, anxiety,
profession,

vi~tue).

The effect of concreteness appears

to be due to the fact that concrete words arouse vivid mental images while abstract words do not, and that imagery
·makes learning easier.
The original work on imagery was conducted in a paired
associates learning context by Paiva, Yuille and Madigan
(1968).

A group of college students was asked to rate nouns

for their capacity to arouse an image.

The results con-

firmed the fact that some words were consistently considered
more imaginal than others (elephant, orchestra, church versus contact, deed, virtue).

The influence of imagery on
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paired associate learning was examined (stimulus words were
matched for frequency and meaningfulness).

Subjects were

given stimulus and response words of a paired associate that
were either high or low in imagery.

The results showed

that recall was the greatest when both the stimulus and the
response words were high in imagery, and recall was the
poorest when both words were low in imagery.

It was conclu-

ded that high imagery (concrete) words were easier to recall
than low imagery (abstract) words.
The influence of imagery on free recall has now been
firmly established.

Words high in imagery are much more

successfully recalled than those low in imagery (Postman,
1975).

Richardson (1975a, 1975b) has shown that although

concreteness is usually linked to imagery, within the category of concrete words, some can be ranked high_in imagery,
some low.

In one of his experiments, in which the recall of

concrete words either high or low in imagery was compared,
it was found that there was no difference between imagery
conditions thus, although concrete stimuli were also usually high imagery stimuli, it is the concreteness that is
the determinant of recall.
In a very recent study, Christian, Bickley, Tarka and
Clayton (1978) established norms for the recall of 900 English nouns.

The probability of recall for each noun was

correlated with the noun's imagery, concreteness, meaning-
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fulness and frequency.

This study again confirmed that

concreteness is a potent predicter of recall.

RATIONALE FOR THE CURRENT STUDY
It has been established that unattended information
is occasionally processed.

Most research dealing with this

phenomena has utilized the auditory modality, probably due
to the methodological conveniences associated with audition
and selective attention (as was outlined in a previous
section of this paper).

Recently, a paradigm was designed

which would permit well controlled investigations of processing of unattended information utilizing the visual modality (Wolford & Morrison, 1980).

This present series of

studies was designed to utilize the visual modality, taking
advantage of Wolford and Morrison's paradigm.
The study by Wolford and Morrison was considered a
visual analog of auditory selective attention paradigms.
Results paralleled auditory selective attention results
in that subjects were generally unaware of the unattended
information (as was first found by Cherry in 195J), but
were aware of their own name when that was present in the
unattended information (as was first found by Moray in 1959)
The goal of this series of investigations was to extend
those findings.

While there has been a great deal of work

done with the auditory modality, very little has been done
with the visual modality.

It was hoped that additional sim-

ilarities would be found.
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It seems that unattended auditory information is probably processed semantically.

Studies conducted by Treisman

(1960) and Gray and Wedderburn (1960) support this fact.
Additional evidence for semantic processing comes from studies conducted by Lackner and Garrett (1972) and MacKay
(1973).

Subjects were presented ambiguous sentences to

their attended ear and, simultaneously, information to
their unattended ear which would disambiguate those sentences.

Subjects were later asked to paraphrase the sen-

tences or select a sentence that was close in meaning (to
the presented sentence) from a set of alternatives.

Al-

though subjects reproted no awareness or memory of the unattended information, that information significantly affected the direction in which the
disambiguated.

attende~

sentences were

The present set of studies investigated

whether or not unattended visual information is processed
semantically.

Three studies were conducted which investi-

gated the clustering effect, the concrete superiority effect, and the Stroop interference effect.

If, at the level

of unattended information, the facilitative effects of clustering, a superiority of recognition for concrete versus
abstract words, or a Stroop interference effect could be
demonstrated, semantic processing would be implied.
Traditionally, there are two explanations which have
been offered to account for processing of unattended in-
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formation.

As described in a previous section, these two

explanations are:

1) that some words have a very low rec-

ognition threshold and are thus recognized very easily,
even without attention delegated to them, and 2) some information is so familiar and processing so practiced that
such processing becomes automatic - the processing of highly
familiar items is accomplished without attention.

Both of

these explanations adequately account for the processing of
very familiar unattended information, such as one's own
name.

The low recognition threshold theory states that

recognition thresholds for certain words may be temporarily
lowered when the probability of occurance of a given word
is high.

This would account for processing which is clas-

sified as semantic in the case of Treisman's and Gray and
Wedderburn's results.

Neither theory would account for the

semantic processing of the type described by Lackner and
Garret (1972) and MacKay (197J), however, although it may
be argued that their results were not as strong as implied.
Newstead and Dennis (1979) presented evidence that MacKay's
results held only under certain specific conditions.

This

series of studies was designed in order to investigate semantic processing of unattended information in conditions
which control for expectancy effects, or the probability
of occurrance of given words, and which therefore cannot
be accounted for with the current explanations.

53
Three studies were conducted using a paradigm similar
to Wolford and Morrison's (1980):

The unattended informa-

tion was presented foveally and the unattended stimulus
was always the only verbal stimulus present (in order to
avoid expectancies).
gle digits.

Single words were flanked by two sin-

The only word presented in each trial was

the unattended word so that it would never be the case that
recognition thresholds were temporarily lowered due to
high probabilities of given words occurring (as was the case
in Treisman's and Gray and Wedderburn's studies).
The first experiment investigated the effect of clustering on processing of unattended information.

Previous

research has shown that subjects are better able to recall
words when they are from a consistent category or chunk
(such as, animals or professions), than when they are unrelated.

This effect was tested with unattended information.

If the information were truly unattended and not processed,
presenting words from a consistent category would not aid
recall.

If words were processed, specifically semantically

processed, subjects would notice that the unattended information is from a consistent category and thus, recall should
be facilitated.

Following the experimental

tas~s

(add the

two single digits from a series of trials), subjects were
given a surprise two alternative forced choice recognition
test.

If they were aware of the fact that the unattended
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words were from one category or cluster (if they processed
that information semantically), they should perform significantly better on the recognition test than if they were unaware of that fact (even if they did not remember specific
words, awareness of the category of words would permit them
to make "educated guesses").
If the unattended words were processed and subjects
were aware of the word category, it would show a need to
revise current explanations of unattended processing, as
neither explanation described above can account for such an
effect (the unattended words were not highly practiced
or meaningful to the subjects, and.there was no attended
information which would have lowered the recognition thresholds for such words).

If subjects were not aware of the

word categories it would strenghten current explanations as
it would imply that unattended information is processed only
when it is highly familiar and/or meaningful.
The second experiment examined the effects of concrete
versus abstract words at the level of unattended information.

Research has shown that, at the level of attended

information, concrete words are much easier to recall than
are abstract words.

Subjects were presented with either

concrete stimuli or abstract stimuli (again flanked by single digits).

Following the experimental task (adding the dig-
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its) subjects were given a surprise recognition test of
the unattended information (the centered words).

If that

information were processed, concrete words should be remembered more often than abstract words.

The results of this

study will again be used to measure the adequacy of current
explanations of unattended processing.
The final study in this series investigated Stroop
type effects.

Previous research has shown that if two dim-

ensions of a stimulus are present, one representing an at·tribute and one representing an attribute name, interference
will occur when a subject is asked to respond to that attribute and to ignore that attribute name, if those two dimensions are conflicting (i.e., if the attribute and the attribute name represent two different things).
same paradigm as in

~he

previous two

studie~.

was tested with unattended visual information.

Using the
this effect
Subjects

saw a word flanked by two single digits and were instructed
to find the sum of the digits and to ignore the centered
word.

Sometimes the centered word was unrelated to the dig-

its, sometimes it was equal to the sum of the digits (in
which case the attribute and the attribute name were consistent), and sometimes it was a number that was equal to
the sum of the digits, plus or minus one (in which case the
attribute and the attribute name were inconsistent).

Inter-

ference effects were tested by measuring response latencies
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(the time the digits were presented to the subjects until
the time they reported the sum).

Recall of the centered

words was later measured with a surprise two alternative
forced choice recognition test, as in the previous studies.
The types of words recalled (if any) would again suggest
ways in which the stimuli were processed (if at all) and
ways in which current explanations of unattended processing
should be revised (if necessary).

EXPERIMENT I
Method
Subjects.
iment.

Sixty subjects participated in this exper-

All subjects were enrolled as students at Loyola

University of Chicago at either the graduate or the undergraduate level.

All subjects were screened for normal or

corrected-to-normal vision using a Snellen eye chart.
Design.

There were five groups in this experiment.

All groups received six blocks of twenty trials each.

On

each trial the stimulus consisted of two single digit numbers separated by five degrees of visual angle.

All sub-

jects were instructed to add the two digits as quickly
and as accurately as

possi~le.

In four conditions there

was a word positioned between the two digits.

Subjects in

these conditions were instructed to ignore that centered
word.

After the sixth block of trials subjects were given

a surprise two alternative force choice recognition test
(for the appropriate four conditions).
Condition 1 represented a control condition, in which
subjects were simply asked to find the sum of the two single digits, without the presence of a centered word.

The

centered words in Condition 2 were from one category of
words.

The words in Condition

57

3 were from two categories
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(ten words from each category) and in Condition 4 were from
four categories (five words from each category).

Words in

Condition 5 were unrelated semantically.
There were 12 subjects in each condition.
latencies were measured in all conditions

Response

Recall of the

centered words was tested in Conditions 2-5.
Apparatus and materials.

Stimuli were presented to

the subjects on a Scientific Prototype Tachistoscope, Model N-1000.

An Erling Counter Timer Frequency Meter was in-

terfaced to the tachistoscope and used to measure reaction
times.
The

~timuli

for all trials, for all conditions, were

two single digit numbers positioned on a screen at a distance of approximately five degrees of visual angle.

The

digits that were used were selected randomly, with the constraint that the sum of the digits would be less than ten.
In Conditions 2-5 there was a word centered between the two
digits.

Examples of stimuli with and without centered words

are shown in Figure 8.

For each word condition the stimuli

were either from one category, from two categories, from
four categories, or from no discernible category.

Appro-

priate words and categories were chased from Cohen, Bousfield and Whitmarch's Cultural Norms for Verbal Items (1957).
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A.

B. 6

Figure 8.

1

5

WORD

2

Examples of stimuli used in Experiment I. A.
A stimulus item used in Condition 1. B. A
stimulus item of the type used in Conditions 2-5.
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For each word condition two sets of stimulus words were
chosen such that one set could be used as stimulus (test)
items and one set as foil items in a subsequent two alternative forced choice recognition test.

All stimulus words

used for each condition are shovm in Appendix A.
Following all experimental trials was a surprise two
alternative forced choice recognition test in which subjects were asked to identify the centered words that they
had seen.

On this recognition test, stimulus (test) items

were paired with foil items (the other set of stimulus
words) matched for length and frequency (on the basis of
Kucera and Francis' 1967 norms).

In Condition 2, all stim-

ulus items were either articles of clothing or animals;
one set of words was used as test items and one set as foil
items.

In Condition J, all stimulus items were either types

of fruit and parts of the body or pieces of furniture and
animals;

one set of words was again used as test items and

and one set was used as foil items.

In Condition 4, all

stimulus items were either metals, articles of clothing,
parts of the body, and animals or types of fruit, modes of
transportation, vegetables, and pieces of furniture; again
one set of words was used as test items and one set as foil
items.

In Condition 5, two sets of words were selected

which did not represent any discernible category; one set
was used as test items and the other as foil items.

In
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each of the above conditions the set of words used as test
items and the set used as foil items were counterbalanced
across subjects.
In order to avoid the possibility that subjects might
not ignore the centered words on the first few trials, the
first two blocks of trials utilized a list of 20 unrelated
words, test items were not introduced until the third block
of trials.

All test items and foil items were randomly

paired in the subsequent recognition test.

The recognition

tests used are shown in Appendix A, as are the initial 20
words used in Blocks 1 and 2 for Conditions 2 Procedure.

5.

As a subject arrived he was tested for

normal (20/20) vision using a Snellen eye chart. Assuming
he had normal or

corrected-to-norma~

vision (those who did

not were not used as subjects), the experiment began.

The

subject sat in a dimly lighted room and viewed the tachistoscope screen binocularly.
At the start of each session the subject was told
that he would see two digits separated by a word (except
in Condition 1).

He was to initiate each trial by pushing

a button in front of him.

When he pushed the button he

would see the two digits and the word (or just the two digits in the case of Condition 1).

His task was to add the

digits as quickly as possible and to ignore the centered
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word, if present.

When the digits appeared on the screen

a clock started, as soon as he knew the sum he was to push
the button again, stopping the clock, and report the sum to
the experimenter.

It was further explained that the pur-

pose of the task was to see how quickly subjects were able
to perform a simple task -(adding the digits) in the presence
of interference (the centered word) which was why he was
to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible.

He

was told that his strategy should be to try to focus on
the digits and ignore the centered word, if he started to
read the centered word it would interfere and slow him
down, and he should be trying to proceed as quickly as possible.

Subjects in Condition 1 were told that the purpose

was to see how quickly subjects could perform a simple
task.

When the subject initiated each trial a display ap-

peared following a 1000 msec foreperiod.
was presented for a duration of

Each display

50 msec.

Each testing session was divided into six blocks of
20 trials each.

In Conditions

2-5 the first two blocks

used an initial set of centered words (as these blocks
were considered practice trials where subjects might not
be adequately ignoring the centered words).

Response lat-

encies for the first two blocks were not scored for any of
the experimental conditions.

The stimulus words of:interest

(the test items) were introduced in the third block of

6J
trials.

Following all trials subjects were given a two

alternative forced choice recognition test and asked to
identify the centered words that they had seen (the words
from Blocks 1 and 2 were not present).
Results.
An analysis of variance yielded no significant differences between resnonse latencies for Blocks (F(J,165=
~

0.461J,

p>.05) or Conditions (f(4,55)=0.JJO,

p~.05)

and

no significant Blocks by Conditions interaction (£12,165=
0.04178,

p~.05).

Figure 9 shows the mean response latencies

as a function of Blocks and Conditions.

Performance did

not improve with practice, as the experiment progressed
from Blocks J through 6, reaction times did not change significantly (as mentioned above, because Blocks 1 and 2 were
considered practice trials, responses for those blocks
were not scored.
There was a significant difference b~tween conditions
for words recalled on the subsequent recognition test
(£(J,44)=J.2J, p<.05) as shown in Figure 10.

Subjects re-

called more words when they were from consistent categories
than when they were from no discernible category.
Discussion.

·

There were no significant differences between response
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latencies across conditions.

Subjects did not display a

practice effect for the last four blocks of trials (the
trials of interest) and did not show any difference in
response times across conditions.

Both of these results

reflect a very improtant foundation for the rest of this
discussion.

Since no practice effects were shown, it can

be assumed that the initial practice trials (Blocks 1 and 2)
were of sufficient number and served to bring subjects up
to an adequate level of performance at the onset of the experimental trials.

The fact that there were no differences

across subjects shows that subjects were performing at the
same speed regardless of whether or not there was a centered
word present in the displays they saw (Condition 1 versus
Conditions

2-5) and regardless of any characteristics of

those centered words (Conditions

2-5).

If those centered

words were being processed in any way, it was without any
extra time alloted to that processing function.
There was a significantly different number of words
recalled on the subsequent recognition tests across conditions.

Subjects recalled the most words under Condition

2 where all the test words were from the same category, and
the least under Condition

5

no discernible category.

As mentioned earlier, unless the

where the test words were from

subjects were processing the centered words semantically,
they would never know that those words were of consistent
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categories and thus, there should be no difference across
category conditions.

Since there was a difference, it

must suggest that subjects were aware of the category factor
and were processing the material semantically.
It should be noted that one possible flaw in the design
of this experiment is that subjects may have been able to
correctly guess the appropriate words when tested in Condition 2.

Because the test words were all from the same

category and because the recognition test consisted of
words from that category and from one other, subjects might
have guessed that the presented words were all from the
same category.

There appeared· to be no simple solution to

this problem (it was decided that a recognition test was
preferable to a recall test, and a recognition test where
the foil items were all of different categories would have
confounded the problem further), although it may indeed
be a problem.

It is suggested that this be born in mind

when interpreting the results.

It still appears that this

effect is a strong one however;

even if this condition is

not considered, there is still a large difference between
recognition rates for the other three conditions (although
not quite significant).
Contrary to expectations, the recognition rate for
the centered words was above chance in all conditions.
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Even in Condition 5 (where the centered words were from
no discernible semantic category), subjects correctly identified an average of
nition test.

1J.5 words on the subsequent recog-

If only chance was operating, which was ex-

pected as a result of previous studies, subjects would have
correctly identified and average of 10 words.

That rec-

ognition was above chance in all conditions implies that
subjects processed the centered words in all conditions,
at least to some minimal degree.

EXPERIIVIENT II
Method.
Subjects.
experiment.

Forty eight subjects participated in this

All subjects were enrolled as students at Loy-

ola University of Chicago at either the graduate or the undergraduate level.

All subjects were screened for normal

or corrected-to-normal vision using a Snellen eye chart.
Design.

There were four groups in this experiment.

All groups received six blocks of 20 trials each.

The

overall design of this experiment was similar to the previous one in that all subjects saw two digits positioned
at a distance of 5° of visual angle (from each other).
In three conditions there was a word positioned between
the digits which the subjects were instructed to ignore.
After the sixth block of trials, subjects were given a surprise two alternative forced choice recognition test (for
the appropriate conditions).
Condition 1 represented a control condition. in which
subjects were asked to compute the sum of the two digits,
without the presence of a centered word.
in Condition 2 were all concrete nouns.

The centered words
The words in Con-

dition J were abstract words, and the words in Condition 4
were comprised of both concrete nouns and abstract words
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(50% of each type).

As in Experiment I, there were two

sets of stimulus words selected for each condition such that
one set was used as test items and one set was used as foil
items in the subsequent recognition test (the use of words
as test or foil items was counterbalanced across subjects).
The stimulus words for each set (and each condition) were
matched for length and frequency.
There were 12 subjects in each condition.

Both re-

sponse latencies and recall of the centered words were measured.
Apparatus and materials.
used were virtually

th~~ame

The apparatus and materials
as in Experiment I.

The only

difference was that the stimulus words (test items and foil
items) were changed.

Initial stimulus words (those used

in the first two blocks of trials), all subsequent stimulus
words, and all subsequent recognition tests are shown in
Appendix B.

All stimulus items (test and foil items) were

matched for length and frequency and randomly paired in
the recognition test.
Procedure.

The procedure utilized was the same as in

Experiment I.
Results.
An analysis of variance yielded no significant dif-
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ferences between response times across conditions (K(J,44)=
0.914, p>.05) or across blocks (K(J,1J2)=0.1767,

p~.os),

nor a significant interaction effect for Blocks by Conditions (f(9,1J2)=0.2259, p).05).

Figure 11 shows the mean

response latencies as a function of Block and Condition.
It appears that response latencies did not change to a significant degree as the experiment progressed from block to
block, or between the different experimental conditions.
An analysis of variance yielded no significant difference between the number of words recalled for each condition (K(2,JJ)=1.009, p>.05).

It should be noted, however,

that although a significant difference was not found, more
concrete words were recognized than abstract words, as
shown in Figure 12 (recognition rates for the condition in
which test items were ten concrete words and ten abstract
words fell directly between the concrete only and the abstract only conditions).

The trend for recognition rates

was in the predicted direction.
Discussion.
No differences in response latencies as a function
of Block or Condition were found.

These results suggest

that no practice effects were exhibited (performance did
rtot change as the experiment progressed from Block J
through Block 6) and that the time alloted to process the
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displays was the same regardless of the experimental condition (processing time was the same when there was no centered word present, when the centered word was concrete,
when the centered word was abstract, and when the centered
words were either concrete or abstract).
The lack of a difference between conditions for word
recognition was surprising.

It was predicted that concrete

words would be remembered more successfully than abstract
words and that recall for the condition which consisted of
both concrete and abstract words would fall between the
concrete only and abstract only recall rates.

It should

again be noted that the results were in the direction predicted, but that the differences were not large enough to
reach significance.

There are two possible explanations·

for this result.
First, the fact that the differences in this experiment did not approach significance was probably due to
the fact that the number of subjects participating in this
experiment was relatively small.

The fewer the number of

measurements taken in an experiment, the greater the differences must be in order to be considered significant.
If the differences noted here remained consistent (thus,
not due to chance) over a larger number of subjects they
would have been considered significant.
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Second, it was established in the first experiment
that recognition memory for a list of 20 unrelated words
was poor (although significantly greater than chance).

In

all conditions within the present experiment the word lists
consisted of unrelated words.

The weak effect exhibited in

this experiment was probably due in part to a floor effect.
The differences might have been larger if this floor effect
had been avoided.

One way in which this problem might be

overcome in a future experiment would be to present words
from consistent categories for all conditions.
Moreover, as mentioned eariler, when selecting the
stimulus items care was taken to select items that could
be classified as either concrete or abstract and to match
all test and foil items for frequency and length.

In a

future study, the effects suggested here might be strenghtened if the stimulus words were selected such that (in
addition to the constraints mentioned above) the concrete
words were highly concrete and the abstract words were very
abstract (this could be done by checking the stimulus words
against the Christian et.al. 1978 norms).

EXPERIMENT III
Method
Subjects.
experiment.

Thirty six subjects participated in this

All subjects were enrolled as students at Loy-

ola University of Chicago at either the graduate or the undergraduate level.

All subjects were again screened for

normal or corrected-to-normal vision using a Snellen eye
chart.
Design.

There were three groups in this experiment.

All groups again received six blocks of 20 trials each.
The overall design of this experiment was similar to that
of the previous two experiments.

Subjects saw similar types

of stimuli under the same instructions.

Condition 1 was a

control condition in which subjects saw only digits with no
centered words.

Condition 2 was a condition similar to

the above conditions in that the centered words were a
set of unrelated nouns.

Of the words in Condition J, 80%

were unrelated nouns, 10% were words equal to the sum of
the digits (for any particular trial), and 19% were words
equal to one plus or minus the sum of the digits for any
particular trial (half were equal to one plus the sum, half
were equal to the sum minus one).

As in the previous stu-

dies, for each word condition two sets of stimulus words
were selected such that one set was used as test items and
76
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one set as foil items in the subsequent recognition test
(words used as test or foil items was counterbalanced across subjects ) .
Again, there were 12 subjects per condition.

Re-

sponse latencies and recall of the centered words were
measured.
Apparatus and materials.

The apparatus and materials

used were virtually the same as in the previous experiments.

The only difference was that the stimulus words

(test items and foil items) were changed.

All stimulus

items were again matched for length and frequency and randomly paired in the recognition test.

Initial stimulus

words (those used in the first two blocks of trials for
all word conditions), all subsequent stimulus words, and
all subsequent recognition tests are shown in Appendix C.
Procedure.

The procedure utilized was the same as

in Experiments I and II.
Results
An analysis of variance yielded no significant differences between response latencies across blocks (£(J,99)=
0.460J, p .05) or across conditions (£(2,JJ)=0.9247, p .05).
There was no significant difference found for the Blocks
by Conditions interaction (£(6,99)=0.1502, p .05).

Fig-
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ure 1J shows the mean response latencies as a function of
Block by Condition.

It appears that reaction time to. the

stimuli did not change to a significant degree as the experiment progressed from block to block, or between the
different experimental conditions.
As it was felt that the Stroop type stimuli might
alter the reaction times in Condition J, data for that
condition was analyzed alone.

Response latencies for the

Stroop type stimuli where the attribute was the same as the
attribute name (the centered number word was equal to the
sum of the two flanking digits), and where the attribute
was not equal to the attribute name (the centered number
word was not equal to the sum of the flanking digits),
and response latencies for non-Stroop type stimuli (the
centered word was unrelated to the flanking digits) were
compared.

There were no significant differences found

(£(2,JJ)=0.0928, p>.05).

These results are shown in Fig-

ure 14.
The mean number of words recognized for Conditions
2 and J were compared.

The results did not reach signif-

icance (!(22)=1.22, p>.05).

It should be noted that more

words were correctly recognized in Condition J (Stroop)
than in Condition 2 (unrelated words), as shown in Figure

15.
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A further analysis was done on the number of words
correctly recognized in Condition

J.

Words correctly rec-

ognized when they were consistent Stroop types, conflicting
Stroop types, and unrelated to the flanking digits were
compared.

No significant differences were found (£(2,22)=

1.942, p>.05).

These results are shown in Figure 16.

Discussion
As in the previous two experiments, no differences in
response latencies as a function of Blocks or Conditions
were obtained.

These results suggested that no practice

effects were exhibited and that the time alloted to process
the stimulus displays was the same regardless of the experimental condition.
It was very surprising that the Stroop type stimuli
did not alter reaction times in Condition J, as this is
contrary to the classical Stroop findings.
possible explanations for this.

There are two

As mentioned in the pre-

vious literature review, it has been suggested that Stroop
interference occurs when one process (usually reading a
color word) is faster than another process (usually naming
the color of the ink).

In this case, the two processes

examined were reading (the centered words) and adding (the
flanking digits).

In this case, it may be that the inter-

ference did not occur because reading may not be faster
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than adding (at least under these conditions, when the sum
of the two digits was always less than ten).
In classical Stroop studies, subjects view a number
of Stroop type stimuli in succession and identify the instructed attribute of those stimuli.

In this experiment,

only 20% of all stimuli could be classified as Stroop type,
with only 10% conflicting Stroop stimuli.

This was due to

the fact that a subsequent surprise recognition test was
used to test subjects' recall of the centered words.

Ob-

viously, only a few numbers could have been used or it
would have rendered the test invalid.

It may be that,

because only a small proportion of the stimuli were actually Stroop stimuli, subjects became more practiced at not
alloting time to that interfering attribute (since it only
actually conflicted once in a while) than they do under a
more traditional Stroop paradigm.
No significant differences between the number of words
correctly recognized for Conditions 2 and J were found.

It

was expected that more words would have been recalled in
Condition J, as the Stroop stimuli were expected to be more
meaningful to the subjects than the unrelated words.

This

trend was evident (more words were recalled in Condition
J), but the differences were not large enough to be con-

sidered significant.

As mentioned pDeviously, this lack
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of significance was probably due, in part, to the relatively small number of subjects participating in this experiment.
Moreover, if the centered words were changed so that
there was not such a poor overall recognition rate, the
expected differences might be apparent.

It is expected

that if this floor effect were avoided, more words would
have been recognized under the Stroop condition than under
the unrelated words condition.

Within the Stroop condition,

it would be expected that the conflicting Stroop-type stimuli would be recognized the most successfully, followed
by the non-conflicting Stroop type and the unrelated words.

GENERAL DISCUSSION
This series of studies was designed in order to see
if visual selective attention was similar to auditory selective attention, if and when unattended information is
"processed", what type of processing occurs at the level
of unattended information, and finally, to evaluate the
adequacy of two unattended processing explanations.
Perhaps the most consistent and striking finding in
this research was the fact that response latencies did
not change to a significant degree across all conditions
in all experiments.

Subjects completed the experimental

task (adding the digits) at the same speed regardless of
whether or not there was a word present between those digits and regardless of whether or not those centered words
(across trials) were of the same category, were of different categories, were concrete, were abstract, or were
Stroop type stimuli.

It has previously been assumed that

if no additional time was alloted to additional stimuli
(RT without versus RT with centered words), those additional
stimuli were not being attended to and were not being processed.
Shiffrin and Gardner (1972) have shown that, at least
in the initial stages of visual processing, processing
takes place without capacity limitations and without at-
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tentional control.

In a letter detection task it was found

that subjects were performing with equal success when they
were asked to detect letters from a set of four letters
displayed simultaneously and when asked to cetect them
from a series of four letters displayed sequentially.

That

response latencies did not change in the present experiments
with or without the presence of a centered word does not
necessarily imply anything about processing those words
(bearing Shiffrin and Gardner's results in mind).

The fact

that no additional time was used to process the presented
information does not necessarily reflect the fact that no
additional processing occured.
Another common assumption when dealing with "unatt~nded

information" is that if subjects do not remember the

presented

informa~ion,

it was not

process~d.

to see how this assumption came about.

It is easy

Although it might

be hard to imagine not seeing the centered words, after completing a series of trials of the type used in this experiment, subjects seem to become unaware of those words.

For

the first few trials the centered word is clearly seen between the two digits, but after a while the digits are focused on and the word is really not consciously attended to.
Anyone who questions this should view a few trials of this
type himself.

After viewing a few trials, most people are

quite certain that the centered words are not processed.
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Following all trials, subjects were given a surprise
recognition test.

Judging from- their reactions and comments

this test was really a surprise, and to expect them to recognize words they never "saw" was about as reasonable as
asking them to predict what words they would see before the
start of the experiment.

Subjects did not think they

saw the words and felt quite certain that they could not
recognize the words.

Based on the subjects' reactions

one would almost certainly assume that the words were never
processed.

On the basis of the results of this series of

studies, however, this appears to be a faulty assumption.
Recognition memory was better than subjects thought
it would be.

While many subjects swore they had no idea

what words were being presented, and that they were randomly indicating words in the subsequent recognition test,
performance in all cases was better than chance (although
only slightly).

Moreover, even when subjects could not

remember the words that were presented, this does not necessarily imply that they did not process those words.

In

previous studies the unattended information was always random and irrelevant to the experimental task, except in the
cases where the unattended information was the subject's
name, when it disambiguated the shadowed message, or when
it completed a sentance started in the shadowed

char~el

and in all of these cases the unattended information was

-
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remembered!

The fact that subjects did not retain con-

tentless, irrelevant messages does not prove that they were
completely unaware of them.
Under several conditions within this present series
of studies the centered words were chosen such that they
would be easier to remember than under other conditions
(i.e. words of consistent categories versus no categories;
concrete words versus abstract words).

When words were

selected that were easy to remember (i.e. words that were
chunked into one category), subjects performed significantly
better on the subsequant recognition test than they did
when words were selected that could not be remembered as
easily.

The lack of significance amoung other conditions

may be attributed to floor effects (due to the difficulty
of remembering the stimulus words).

It does not seem at

all logical to assume that under some conditions the centered words were processed and under some conditions they
were not when the same experimental procedure was used across all conditions.

What is logical to assume however,

is the fact that under some conditions the centered words
were remembered more successfully than under other conditions.

This differential recognition effect reflects the

ease of recall of the centered words between conditions,
it does not reflect a differential processing rate between
conditions.
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An assumption prevalent in the Stroop literature is
that subjects cannot "turn off" the processing of highly
familiar information even if they want to, and that this
processing interferes with the processing of other information.

This assumption has been formed on the basis of

the interference effect of one attribute on the processing
of another attribute of the stimuli being processed (when
the attributes are of the same response class but represent conflicting attributes).

This interference effect is

very robust and has been shown in almost all Stroop studies.
t~

In all of those Stroop studies subjects are asked

respond to a long series of stimuli, all of which con-

tain a conflict between the attributes.

In the present

experiment, Stroop type stimuli were only 20% of the total
number of stimuli presented to the subjects (due to other
experimental constraints).
not exhibited.

The interference effect was

It seems that in an experiment in which

conflicting attributes were rarely present (attributes represented the same response class for 20% of the trials 10% were consistent and 10% were conflicting) subjects
were able to "turn off" the interference effect of processing those attributes.

When conflicting attributes

rarely occurred subjects were able to train themselves to
allot an equal amount of time to monitering those attributes
as they did to moniter all other stimulus attributes.
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On the basis of the results of this series of studies,
it is believed that "unattended" visual processing is similar to "unattended" auditory processing.

It seems that

unattended (peripheral) information is processed even
when it is not highly meaningful or highly familiar to the
subjects.

The critical distinction seems to be between the

PROCESSING of unattended information and the later RECOGNITION of unattended information.

It appears that un-

attended messages are processed, specifically semantically
processed (with both auditory and visual stimuli), but unless those messages are meaningful or relevant to the subject or his experimental task, they aren't remembered (or
at least not sufficiently for accurate recognition).
In the case in which a subject's name is presented, he
remembers it because it is so meaningful to him.

In the

case of the presentation of a series of unrelated words,
irrelevant both to the subject personally and to the task
at hand, subjects would not be expected to retain that information.

When unattended information is presented that

is irrelevant but is very simple to remember (such as a
series of types of fruit), subjects can be expected toretain that information without effort, at least temporarily.
Again, it cannot be assumed that because information
is not remembered it was not processed.

Processing of in-

formation and the subsequent recognition of information are
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very distinct processes which sometimes, but do notalways go together.

The explanations of processing unattended

information discussed earlier account very nicely for the
processed unattended information which is usually retained
and recognized:
the subjects.

Information which is very meaningful to
They do not account for information that is

not necessarilly meaningful but is very easily retained
and they do not even come close to accounting for all the
unattended information which is processed but not retained.
It appears that only slight modifications of current
explanations are needed to account for all unattended information that is retained.

A model that accounts for all

the unattended information that is processed, however, must
be much more complex, much more sophisticated, and much
more sensitive than any of the gross processing models
suggested to date.
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~02GS

US~D

IN THE FIRST

HUT
OA~.

V.2:NUS
PATHS

?I 'I'

GROVE

SEATS

NAILS
CURB
CAL;:::

EOOT
LEVER
ARCH
RP.BEIT

co:z:r.::r:H

l-IE
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T~O

3LOCKS 0? TRIAlS

TEST ITEMS USED IN CONDITION 2
SET A

SET B

TOPCOAT

DOG

COAT

GOAT

CAP

BEAR

PANTS

LAMB

SWEATER

DEER

SOCKS

TIGER

JACKET

CAT

BLOUSE

ELEPHANT

GLOVES

BULL

SHIRT

MOUSE

SLACKS

FOX

OVERCOAT

WOLF

SHORTS

LION

SKIRT

cow

SHOES

MONKEY

SCARF

PIG

GOWN

PONY

TIE

RABBIT

BELT

SHEEP

JEANS

BEAVER
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RECOGNITION TEST USED IN CONDITION 2

In each of the following items there is one word which was
present in the displays you just saw and one word which was
not. Please circle the word which was present.
1.

DOG

co~·JN

2. TIE

GOA'T

3. BEAR

GlOVES

4.

SHORTS

IAr~:E

5. 30Ch.S

DI::ER

6. CAP

TIGER

7. SCARF

CAT

8 . EL2PlLI\NT

Sl".. IRT

9· JE:.l\I\:s

BUll

10. OVERCOAT

Iv.OUS.S

11. SLACKS

FOX

12. COAT

v'JOLF

1J. LION

SHOES

14. CO':J

BELrr

15. I·.,ONr(EY

'IOFCOA'T

16. ?IG

StrfEATER

17. FONY

JACL-..ZT

18. SHIRT

RAEEIT

19.

FAl{TS

SH;;E?

20. E=::AVZR
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BLOUSE

TEST ITEMS USED IN CONDITION J
SET A

SET B

LIP

TIGER

EAR

RUG

THROAT

COUCH

WRIST

BEAR

ANKLE

PIG

FIG

STOOL

PEAR

PIANO

KNEE

MOUSE

LEMON

LAMP

TOE

BUFFET

BANANA

DEER

PEACH

BENCH

ORANGE

WOLF

CHERRY

MULE

APPLE

FOX

LIME

STOVE

ELBOW

cow

PLUM

SOFA

RIBS

MONKEY

TOOTH

ROCKER
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RECOGNITION TEST USED IN CONDITION 3
In each of the following items there is one word which was
present in the displays you just saw and one word which was
not. Please circle the word which was present.

.
2.

1

TIGER

LElV~OI\f

RUG

1

,1JrtiST

J. LIP

COUCE

4. E2AR

LI~VE

5.

:_:LUTI~

PIG

6

STOOL

TOE

7 . CHERRY

j_JIANO

. TOO'I'H

I'.lOU3E

8

9.

EAi,~Ai'~A

LAi··~=i·

. BUFFET
11 . DEER
12 . ELBQi.·J
13 . :;·JOLF

TEROAT

14. RIES

r.. UL.2

.
16 .

FEAR

rCX

?IG

3rr'0 1f2

CO'iJ

AI';~~L~

SOFA

?EACE

~(~I\EE

l\':ONro..SY

ROCr(ER

ORP.NC:.E

10

15

17 .

.
19 .
20 .

18
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3AR.

3ZNCH
AJ?FLE

TEST ITEMS USED IN CONDITION 4
SET A

SET B

ZINC

POTATO

TIN

LAMP

DEER

COUCH

BULL

STOOL

LIP

CABBAGE

JEANS

BEANS

FOX

JEEP

COPPER

PEPPER

WRIST

RUG

LION

LEMON

BRONZE

STOVE

SKIRT

SUBWAY

TEETH

ORANGE

TIRE

LIME

RIBS

JET

SLACKS

SAILBOAT

ELBOW

TAXI

BRASS

PENS

SWEATER

APPLE

MONKEY

PEACH
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RECOGNITION TEST USED IN CONDITION 4
In each of the following items there is one word which was
present in the displays you just saw and one word which was
not. Please circle the word which was present.
LIP
1. CABBAGE
2. JEEP

FOX

J. SUBWAY

SKIRT

4. BRASS

PENS

5. TAXI

ELBOW

6. DEER

COUCH

7. BEANS

JEANS

8. BULL

STOOL

9. ZINC

POTATO

10. LAMP

TIRE

. 11. MONKEY

PEACH

12. BRONZE

STOVE

1J. RIBS
14. PEPPER

JET

15. WRIST

RUG

16. LIME

TIN

17. SLACKS

SAILBOAT

18. TEETH

ORANGE

19. APPLE
20. LEMON

SWEATER

COPPER

LION
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TEST ITEMS USED IN CONDITION 5
SET A

SET B

DRUM

JUICE

TANK

RIB

TIN

STEREO

BRONZE

PINT

TUB

BUBBLE

CLIFF

DOT

SODIUM

DOLLS

LEAF

PLOW

FERRY

GHOST

WIRES

GLOBE

DENTIST

CEMENT

LIME

ASH

SAIL

TOURIST

MAP

BLADE

STREET

RUG

ORGAN

SILK

BEE

CALF

BABIES

SHELF

BEDS

PUMP

ATLAS

COUCH
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RECOGNITION TEST USED IN CONDITION 5
In each of the following items there is one word which was
present in the displays you just saw and one word which was
not. Please circle the word which was present.
1. BEE

CALF

2 . 1;.JIRES

GlOBE

J. BEDS

Fur~P

4. ATLAS

COUCH

5 . BABIES

SH.c;LF

6. DOT

CLIFF

'7
I

.

SilK

OF.GAN

8 . ASE

LIL1lE

9. LEAF

1.'10\;'j

10. !-INT

BRONZE

11.

JUICE

DRU~·~

12. SODiur,;

DOLLS

1J. RIB

TANr~

14. TUB

BUBBLE

15. TOURIST

SAIL

16.

DENTL37'

CEI'::Ef~ 'I'

17. TIN

ST~RJO

18. R"·'""'
Ul..;

STR~ET

19. BLADE

I.:AP

20. GHOST

F'SP~RY
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ArPEtiDIX E

110

;:;Tiri,ULUS ;JORDS USiD IN THE FIRST hJO BLOC.\S OF 'I·RIALS

RIB
PINT
BLADE
RUG
GLOBE
JUICE
PUI'v1P

GHOST

DOT

ASH
CAlF
STEREO

SILK
SHELF

TOURIST

DCLLS
BUEBLE

COUCH
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TEST ITEMS USED IN CONDITION 2
SET B

SET A
PIE

SUNNY

RAKE

TANK

COPPER

BABIES

RABBIT

SODIUM

ARCH

BEDS

LEVER

ORGAN

BOOT

LEAF

CAKE

MAP

CURB

SAIL

NAILS

CLIFF

SEATS

FERRY

COMPASS

DENTIST

GROVE

ATLAS

PIT

BEE

CONE

DRUM

PEPPER

BRONZE

PATHS

LIME

VENUS

WIRES

OAK

TIN

HUT

TUB
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RECOGNITION TEST USED IN CONDITION 2
In each of the following items there is one word which was
present in the displays you just saw and one word which was
not. Please circle the word which was present.

1. ATlAS

GROVE

2. BABBlES

CO?P3R

3. ARCH

BEDS

4. COiv1PASS

DENTIST

c::

BOOT

.-1 •

LEAF'

lE.tlER

6 . ORGAN
.....
(

.

SAil

CURB

8 . RABBIT

SODIUl<i

9· TAI,\K

RA1·2

10. OAK

TIN

11. DEE

PIT

12.

EROl,~Z1::

FEPPEE

1J. NAilS

CLIFF

14. DRUk

CCJ:~E

15. SEATS

FERRY

16 .

\.rzy,:rJs

JIIRES

17. TUi3

HUT

18 .

FI~

SUNf,IY

19.

lif·-'~E

FA'I'HS

20.

~lAP

CAKE

11J

TEST ITEMS USED IN CONDITION 3
SET B

SET A
AFFIRM

TON

APr

CONFIRM

CEASED

ATE

EGO

LEASE

COUNTS

GRIEF

NULL

RISEN

DEAF

NOTNING

WARN

FEE

OWNS

OWE

DESERVE

HERS

RELY

COMMIT

DIES

HUFF

DIMLY

BULK

EATEN

SURE

THY

MERGE

IRONY

THEFT

FREED

CORN

IMPLY

AIMS

HARSH

SEEKS

SHY

AMPLE
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RECOGNITION TEST USED IN CONDITION J
In each of the following items there is one word which was
present in the dis-plays you just saw and one word which was
not. Please circle the word which was present.

1

. AFFIRI'·:

.
J.

2

TON

CEAS3D

AT3

GRIZF

COUNTS

4. 1-iOTING

. n2RS
6 . DIES
7.

DEAF
D~S"SR\!:2

~

../

HUFF

:au1~\.

DU<LY

8

. SORE

EAT:2:N

9

.

FR.2ED

SARN

10 .

\:; Li!tl:..~

.......

~.~~

EAF:.SH

11 . H.-, PLY

An:s

12 . TE.2? T

IROrY

1

13

.

14.
,..,

•
.i.]

.

1

'ii1-iV
..L. 1 ... ..1.

h~EF:GE

R~IY

COi'J·:iiT

OI'JNS

O'·IF
..
~

16 .

.FE~

17 .

Aiv~:!?lZ

SHY

18

NULL

RIS:::N

10 .

~G-t)

LEASE

COiiFIRL

..tl.:· ..1..

/

20

.

IJAPJ'r

1
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r\ ;-,ifl

TEST ITEMS USED IN CONDITION 4
SET B

SET A
TON

TOURIST

DENTIST

RIB

ORGAN

EGO

SAIL

SILK

HERS

WARN

TIN

DESERVE

BULK

ASH
GHOST

BEE
EARN

IMPLY

CLIFF

DOT

FERRY

EATEN

THEFT

JUICE

MERGE

IRONY

WIRES

THY

OWE

DEAF

STREET

OWNS

AMPLE

SHELF

RISEN

GLOBE

MAP

NULL

CONFIRM

BLADE
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RECOGNITION TEST USED IN CONDITION 4
In each of the following items there is one word which was
present in the displays you just saw and one word which was
not. Please circle the word which was present.
1. TOURIST

CONFIRN

2. EGO

DENTIST

J. NULl

RIS~N

4. SHELF

AI'•1Pl:5:

5· 'vvARN

SAIL

6. OV'JNS

OVJE

7. ORGAN

SILK

8. THY

r11ERGE

9· IRONY

THE:FT

10. BEE

II(PLY

11. TIN

ASH

12. DOT

SARN

1J. EATEN

CliFF

14. BULK

GHOST

15. FERRY

JUIC.C::

16.

HERS

DES~RVE

17. DEAF

~-~JIR~S

18. STREET

GlOBE

19. 1'ilAP

BlADE

20. RIB

TON
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APPENDIX C

118

:STir•;ULUS ,JORDS US..2:D IN THE FIRST T.JO ELOCr.:.S 0? TRIALS

F2RRY

STREET
STEREO
DENTIST
SAIL
BUBBLE
TAN!\:
DOLLS
JUICE
BRONZE

:r-.;Lmv
LIM.E
ORGAN
CLIFF
SHELF
COUCH

GLOBE
CALF
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TEST ITEMS USED IN CONDITION 2
SET A

SET B

COUCH

CAKE

BUBBLE

PATHS

DOLLS

RAKE

TOURIST

OAK

PLOW

RABBIT

SHELF

HUT

SILK

CURB

STEREO

LEVER

CALF

COMPASS

ASH

VENUS

DOT

SEATS

CEMENT

ARCH

GHOST

l'IT

PUMP

PEPPER

JUICE

COPPER

GLOBE

NAILS

RUG

GROVE

BLADE

PIE

PINT

BOOT

RIB

CONE
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RECOGNITION TEST USED IN CONDITION 2
In each of the following items there is one word which was
present in the displays you just saw and one word which was
not. Please circle the word which was present.
1. RIE

CAKE

2. PINT

PATHS

J. HAKE

BLAD:2:

4. RUG

OAK

5 . RABBIT

GLOBE

6. JUICE

HUT

?.

CURB

PUifJP

8 . GHOST

LEV:2R

9. CO!vi?ASS

CEMENT

10. DOT

VENUS

11. SEATS

ASH

12. ARCH

CALF

1J. STEREO

PIT

14.

C:TT ~ ..;....) .J....a.....•~

F·EPPER

15. SHELF

COPPER

16.

COUCH

I'; AILS

17. BUBBLE

GRO\lE

18. £-IE

:COILS

19. BOOT

TOURIST

20. PLO'iJ

CONE
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TEST ITEMS USED IN CONDITION 3
SET B

SET A
RIB

GLOBE

NAILS

GROVE

BUBBLE

SEVEN

PIE

ONE

NINE

FOUR

BOOT

SIX

JUICE

CAKE

STEREO

CURB

TEN

OAK

RABBIT

POTATO

TWO

COPPER

PINT

CONE

ARCH

CEMENT

SEATS

BLADE

THREE

TOURIST

RAKE

SILK

PUMP

VENUS

COMPASS

PIT

PEPPER

CALF

PLOW

COUCH
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RECOGNITION TEST USED IN CONDITION 3
In each of the following items there is one word which was
present in the displays you just saw and one word which was
not. Please circle the word which was present.
1.

~:.:EPPER

COUCH

2. CALF

COl'hFASS

3. RAKE

1'

4. CEKENT

fii'~T

5. }IE:

pnrrp
·,) u . .

6. ONE

BUBBLE

7· CONE

T~·JO

8. RABBIT

COl'P]R

9·

·-t

.....,._.

~

1"T"...,.

~

- ... 7\ ..

~~~; ~1,

10. ?OTATO
11.

~-r-\j\T

''1:!.•• u:::,

r~AILS

TEN

GR.0 1·iE

RIB

12. NINE

SIX

1J. CAKE

BOOT

14. l-'LOW

GlOBE

15. JUIC.2

CURE

16. BLAJE

ARCH

17.

'I'OURIST

S.SATS

18. STEREO

OA:i\.

19. SILK

THREE

20. PIT

1:-'Uiv:P
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